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THE RAILROAD LEASES TO CONTROL
ANTHRACITE COAL TRADE.
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ARE THEY VOID UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA?
BY SYDNEY G. FISHER, ESQ.

The Constitution of Pennsylvania forbids parallel or
competing lines of railroad to lease or in any way control
each other. ' This provision is found in the constitutions
or codes of many of the States. It was adopted as the
result of long and bitter experience, and is generally
regarded as a valuable safeguard for the people against the
greed and power of corporations.
It was based on two ideas or propositions : First, that
it is a good thing for railroads to compete, because competition makes low rates, and that is a benefit to the people.

Secondly, that it is a good thing to prevent railroads from
consolidating, because when consolidated they become
more powerful than the government, corrupt the government, and endanger the liberties of the people.
Two suits have been thus far instituted to annul the
Reading leases and agreements with the Lehigh Valley

and the Jersey Central: one by Mathias H. Arnot, a citizen
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who considers himself injured, and the other by the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
From the bills and answers filed in these cases we gather
the principal facts.
The anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania is a district
of about 470 or 500 square miles, lying in the counties of
Schuylkill, Carbon, Northumberland, Columbia, Luzerne,
Lackawanna and Dauphin. This is the only tract of land
in the United States where anthracite coal is found.
Before the leases were made, about three-fourths of all
the coal taken from this region was carried by three sepaate and independent railroad systems-the Reading, the
Lehigh Valley, and the Jersey Central-which competed
with each other, more or less, except where the competition
was checked by pools or agreements.
There was first the Reading, whose main line extended
from Philadelphia to Mount Carbon, in the anthracite
region. The Reading tapped the district on its west side,
and shot out from itself numerous branches and leased lines
to collect the coal. It carried the coal to tide-water at
Philadelphia, where it met with but little competition. It
also, by a series of lines which it owned, leased, or with
which it had traffic arrangements, carried coal to tide-water
at New York, where it endured a sharp competition from
the other two roads. It had a satellite known as the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, whose stock
it owned, and whose bonds it guaranteed. The satellite
owned large tracts of coal lands which it worked by collieries, and sent the coal to market over the tracks of its fostermother, the Reading Railroad. It was an arrangement to
insure profit; for the combination was bound to make something either by mining the coal or by hauling it.
Secondly, there was the Lehigh Valley Railroad.
This, like the Reading, was a Pennsylvania corporation,
and tapped the anthracite district on the east side. Its
main line extended from Easton on the Delaware up the
Lehigh Valley to Wilkesbarre. When it reached the coal
district it shot out branches and leased lines to gather in
the product. A map of these two roads, the Reading and
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the Lehigh, shows them approaching the fruitful district,
from the southeast, getting into it from different sides,
and, as soon as they are in, spreading out like fans or
the fingers of a hand until they almost touch, and in one
place are closely parallel for twenty-five miles. The Lehigh
Valley carried its coal in two main directions-northwest
to Buffalo and the Great Lakes, where it did not compete
much with the Reading; and eastward by means of lines
leased or controlled by it to New York tide-water, where
its competition with the Reading was very severe. It was
also interested in getting coal to Philadelphia tide-water.
But as the Reading had a monopoly there, the competition
at that point was slight. The Lehigh, like the Reading,
had a satellite, called the Lehigh Valley Coal Company,
which owned and leased large tracts of coal lands and
shipped the product over the tracks of its foster-mother.
Thirdly, there was the Central Railroad Company of
New Jersey. It was a New Jersey corporation, and had a
line extending from Phillipsburg on the Delaware, immediately opposite Easton, Pennsylvania, to tide-water at or
near New York. It had worked itself into the anthracite
region in the manner following:
At Phillipsburg there began a line of railroad, called
the Lehigh and Susquehanna, which crossed the Delaware
to Easton, Pennsylvania, and extended from there to Union
Junction, running parallel with the Lehigh Valley Railroad;
and it had branches and leased roads extending into the
coal regions. It was owned by another organization,
a Pennsylvania corporation, called the Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Company. From this company the Jersey
Central leased the Lehigh and Susquehanna, and thus
entered the coal regions. It also had its satellites; for the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, which owned .the
Lehigh and Susquehanna, owned also large tracts of coal
land, and sent the product to market after the manner of a
good and worthy satellite. But the Jersey Central was not
content with one satellite. - It had another, the Lehigh and
Wilkesbarre Coal Company, which owned and leased large
tracts of coal land and performed all the duties of a satellite.
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Such were the three great systems which for many
years have transported three-fourths of all the coal that was
mined in the anthracite region. On the eleventh and
twelfth days of February, 1892, one of these monsters swalloved the other two. It was the Reading whose maw was
thus capacious; and it was managed in this wise.
The Reading, first of all, leased the whole Lehigh
Valley system and all it contained, branch roads, leased
lines, satellites and everything. That was on February ii,
1892. The next day it gathered in the Jersey Central
system, but not so directly and easily. It put forward a
little satellite called the Port Reading Railroad Company,
a New Jersey corporation, which owns a line of road from
Bound Brook to Arthur Kill, a tide-water tributary of New
York Bay. This Port Reading Company, by a previous
understanding with its mother, went and swallowed the
Jersey Central system by means of a lease, taking branch
roads, leased lines, Lehigh and Susquehanna and everything. Having got the Jersey Central system comfortably
within the satellite, the Reading guaranteed the lease and
process by which it had been done.
"What was the object of all this?"
"Oh, nothing at all; just to make more money; but
not to increase the price of coal."
But what does the Constitution of Pennsylvania say
about proceedings of that kind?
"No railroad, canal, or other corporation, or the lessees, purchasers, or managers of any railroad or canal corporation, shall consolidate the stock, property or franchises
of such corporation with, or lease or purchase the works or
franchises of, or in way control, any other railroad or canal
corporation owning or having under its control a parallel
or competing line."1
It will be observed that the Constitution says "parallel or competing;" so that competition alone without parallelism comes within the clause. In Commonwealth v.
South Penna. R. R.,' and Commonwealth v. Beach Creek,
IArticle XVII, Section 4.
i Penna. County Court Rep., 214.
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etc., R. R.,' it was held that control of any kind, whether
direct or indirect, was forbidden. The Court forbade the
Pennsylvania Railroad to gain control of the South Penn
by making the Pennsylvania Company a cat's paw to acquire the control. It also enjoined the Pennsylvania Railroad from controlling the Beach Creek Railroad by means
of the Northern Central. These two cases decided that the
courts will look into the real merits of the situation and
discover how the control is to be exercised, and that any
kind of control, whether direct or through the medium of
an agreement or a friendly line, will be prohibited.
Now, the parallelism between the Reading and Lehigh
is in one instance supposed to be rather slight. The bills
charge a parallelism of about twenty-five miles between
Taihauend Junction and Mount Carmel. The answer
admits the parallelism, but denies that it involves any competition worth considering. The coal carried from those
points by the Reading is taken either northwesterly to
Williamsport, or southwesterly to Philadelphia, neither of
which points is reached by the Lehigh, whose coal from
the neighborhood of Mount Carmel and Tamanend Junction
is taken easterly to Penn Haven Junction. The general
merchandise carried at these points of parallelism is, the
Reading assures us, very insignificant, and not subject to
competition by the Lehigh. The merchandise traffic for
the year I891 amounted to only $i,971.6o, and the passen-

ger traffic to only $6,238.18, making in all $8,209. 78.
The Reading, so far as this actual parallelism is concerned, evidently intends to rely on the dQctrine, "De
mfinimis non cural lexa."

But the question arises, is it a

trifle? Twenty-five miles of parallelism is not a small
thing. A railroad that long might earn enormous dividends; and some railroads of only half that length near
great centres of population are well known to earn enormous dividends. Perhaps the traffic is small now; but it
may become very large in the course of the next nine
hundred and ninety-nine years, the period of the lease.
Moreover, the present merchandise traffic of $8,209.78
11

Ibid.,

223.
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is not a trifle to the people who live in that neighborhood.
And, it may be asked, did not the Constitution intend to
protect these few people? It certainly did. It intended
to protect everybody; that is its function. It was not
adopted by the people for the purpose of protecting the
public in a vague, general way, and allowing a few hundred
or a few thousand individuals here and there to be crushed.
The question is one of civil rights under the organic law
of the State; and in such questions, so long as there is any
appreciable injury to an individual or individuals, the
doctrine of de rzinimis does not apply.
Suppose the answer of the Reading to be true, that
although the roads are parallel for that twenty-five miles,
Can the
yet there has thus far been no competition.
Court accept or act upon such a fact? Possibly the r6ads
do not now compete. But if they are parallel, will they not
necessarily, or in all human probability, compete within
the next thousand years save one? The Constitution
forbids parallel roads to lease or control each other, and
forbids it in plain language. Is it for the courts to define
away that language by saying that just at present the
parallelism does not produce competition? The provision
of the Constitution was made to protect the people for the
future and for all time. Parallel roads were forbidden to
lease, because parallelism usually brings competition. If
there were only a hundred farmers and trappers within
that twenty-five miles of parallelism, they are entitled to
the protection of the Constitution; they are entitled to
have competition maintained. They are entitled to have
it maintained for all time; for within the next thousand
years they may grow from a hundred to a hundred thousand, or their farms may be the seat of a great city or of
two or three cities.
It is hardly an answer to say that the Court should
allow the lease to stand until there is competition, and
when, in the future, competition arises, annul the lease.
In the same way it might be said that if the competition,
having arisen, should in the future cease, the Court should
revive the lease; and then, when the competition arose
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again, annul the lease again. The Court is not given the
power to play fast and loose with a lease-to adjudicate it
good, and then with a change of trade, adjudicate it void.
The Court is not a railroad administrator, a railroad commissioner or an Interstate Commerce Commission. Is the
lease good or bad to-day?-that is the question. The
Court is called upon to construe the law and the Constitution; and the Constitution says as plainly as words can
say that parallel lines shall not lease or control each other.
It is doubtful whether the Court can go further than merely
to find whether the lines are parallel. Whether the parallelism at present produces competition or not is hardly the
question; for the Constitution says flatly that parallel lines
shall not lease.
There is another instance of parallelism which is by
no means a trifle. The Lehigh and Susquehanna Railroad
is parallel for practically its entire length, a distance of 1O5
miles, with the Lehigh Valley. Before the leases were
made, the Lehigh and Susquehanna, through its owner,
the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, or through its
lessee, the Jersey Central, was an active competitor of the
Lehigh Valley, which lies directly alongside of it. By the
leases, the R.eading has leased the Lehigh Valley on the
iith of February and stepped into its shoes, and the next
day it gains control of the Lehigh Valley's competitor and
parallel, the Lehigh and Susquehanna. It makes no difference that it accomplishes that control in a roundabout
way, by getting the Port Reading Company to lease the
Jersey Central, which leases the Lehigh and Susquehanna,
and then guaranteeing the contract and lease made by the
Port Reading. The Court has already decided .in the
South Penn and Beach Creek cases that this indirect control is just as bad as a direct lease ; and, moreover, the
Constitution says that parallel or competing lines shall not
purchase, lease or "in any way control"I each other.
The matter is, indeed, too clear for argument. There
is no question of the close parallelism and close competition; and the Reading, in its answer, shows no signs of
making light of the question.
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There is another apparent instance of competition
which the Reading says is also a trifle that the law will
not regard. There is a colliery, called the Mount Carmel
Colliery, the property of Mr. T. M. Righter, which is
reached by both the Reading and the Lehigh. This man
has been apparently enjoying the privilege of having two
competing lines by which to ship his coal. He has also
apparently made some use of the situation, sending, the
answer says, during the year 1891, 36,ooo tons by the Reading, and 23,000 tons by the Lehigh-a total of 59,000.
This apparent competition is somewhat spoiled by the
fact, of which we are assured from reliable sources, that
Mr. Righter leases all his coal land from either the Reading or the Lehigh, and ships the coal produced on any
part of it over the road of the company that owns it.
The fact that the Reading and Lehigh have owned a
large part of the coal they carried, and in the future will
own it all, is a troublesome factor in the problem.
The competition and parallelism between the Lehigh
Valley and the Lehigh and Susquehanna are clear, and
necessarily prohibit the Reading from controlling first one
and then the other. The parallelism - between the Lehigh
Valley and the Reading for the twenty-five miles from
Tamanend Junction is also clear. But what shall be said
of the parallelism and competition between the Reading
and the Lehigh, taking each road as a whole?
This is the most difficult part of the case; and it is
impossible to come to any definite opinion about it with
the facts at our command. It would require a long investigation and careful examination into the history of the
two roads before any intelligent result could be reached.
First, are the roads parallel? In a certain sense, they
are. A glance at the map shows that they run in the
same general direction, within Pennsylvania, keeping
about fifty miles apart. At what distance do roads, parallel in a wide sense, become parallel in a legal sense?
The Courts have not decided. But it is not likely that
they would declare the Reading and the Lehigh parallel in
the sense the Constitution means.
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If we may hazard a definition, we might say that railroads are parallel, in the sense intended by the Constitution, when they run side by side and near enough to each
other to make it inherently probable that they will, at
some time or other, compete for freight or passengers.
The Reading and the Lehigh are hardly near enough to
each other to make their parallelism necessarily involve
competition. We are, therefore, driven to the other question: Did they, as a matter of fact, compete before the
leases were made?.
Again, we must ask, what is competition? and again
we must hazard a definition.
Railroads compete, in the sense intended by the Constitution, when, if left to themselves, without the interyentions of pools, combinations or agreements, they would
bid against each other for the same freight or passengers.
Now, there is no question but that the Reading and the
Lehigh both drew their anthracite freight from that region
of about 500 square miles. Were they bidding against
each other for the same freight?
"No," they would answer, "because, with the exception of that colliery of Mr. Righter's, each of us ran to a
different set of collieries; and, in many instances, each of
us owned the coal we carried."
The reply to this is: Did you not refrain from running
to the same collieries because of a private understanding
or agreement between yourselves, by which each was to
work his own field; and does not this agreement show that
naturally there was competition between you?
Was not each one of you prevented from raising rates
beyond a certain point by the fear that the understanding
would be broken, and your rival would build a .line to the
colliery against whom you had raised the rates, or that that
colliery would build a private line to reach your rival?
If you had fears and agreements of this sort, then
there was competition between you.
Moreover, you were owners of coal, as well as carriers
of it. Do you mean to say that you did not compete with"
each other as sellers of this coal? If, although chartered

THE ANTHRACITE COAL TRADE.

as a railroad, you, through the formality of another corporation, become a coal miner, is not the Court bound to
notice your competition in that respect and discover
whether it is included in the intention of the Constitution?
By your leases you have acquired the ownership of the
principal part of the anthracite coal of the United States.
Most of the remaining part you have bought up by an
agreement with the private collieries to take it, at the
mouth of the mine, at a fixed percentage of whatever may
be the market price.
Thus you pradtically control the
price of all the anthracite coal in the United States. There
are no more rates on anthracite. You own the anthracite
and you carry it. You can call it all rate or all price, just
as suits your bookkeeping.
Do you mean to say that, before making this combination, you two were not competitors; and that you did not
make this combination tb wipe out the inconveniences of
competition ?
When the Constitution said that competing railroads
should not lease or control each other in any way, did it
mean merely as carriers for others? Did it mean that they
could avoid competing as carriers by each one owning the
product they carried? Did it mean that after that they
could combine, buy up all of a valuable product produced
only in Pennsylvania, and say, "We take it to market
not as carriers, but as owners?"I
The people of Pennsylvania at large, every man and
every family that burn coal in winter, can be affected by
such a combination. The question resolves itself to this:
Has not the Reading, by means of these lines, the power
of controlling the price of anthracite? Has it not a power,
in this respect, which, before the lease, it had not? If it
has such a power, then the lease is that species of control
forbidden by the Constitution.
The Constitution aims at power. It aims to cut down
power dangerous to the people. It-aims to prevent power
getting into hands where it may be used against the people.
'Itaims to prevent possibilities and probabilities. It is not
enough that the power thus far, up to the time of the
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decision of the Court, has not been abused. It may hereafter be abused; and that is enough.
The Constitution did not intend the courts to be deceived by present appearances or by assertions, or even
economical proofs, that, in all probability, the rates would
remain the same, or, at the worst, would not be raised extravagantly. If the rates remain the same, the competing
roads are still forbidden to control each other, because the
control puts it in their power to raise the rates whenever
they choose. It is that power over the citizen's pocket
which the Constitution was aiming to strike down. It
would be very futile and weak for the Court to say,
"We will let you lease; but the moment you raise the rate
one penny in consequence of the power we have given
The
you, that moment we will take your lease away."
Constitution forbids even the grant of such power. It forbids the courts to give such power. It does not give them
leaire to give the power and then regulate it afterward.
If the rate is raised only half a penny per ton, the constitutional prohibition applies to that half-penny as much
as to a dollar. If you admit the possibility of a rise of
half a penny in consequence of the new power given, you
admit that you are within the reason and mischief aimed
at by the constitutional prohibition.
So far as the law is concerned, the question cannot be
placed on the basis of profit-sharing. It may be that, as a
matter of political economy, it would be wiser for the
people of Pennsylvania to pay twenty-five cents more a ton
for anthracite coal and have the Reading a solvent corporation. That is not the question before the Court. The
question is, what the Constitution says, what it means, and
what are the reasons for that meaning.
This brings us to the broader view of the subject:
What was the whole object of the people in adopting that
clause of the Constitution? Was it merely to get cheaper
rates for themselves-a difference of two cents a mile in
hauling passengers or a difference of twenty-five cents a
ton in hauling coal? Was it not for a larger purpose?
Was it not their method of solving the great question of

iI
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the age-the corporation problem? They were liberal
to the corporations; they always had been.
They
recognized in them the great instrument of modern development. But they intended to check their enormous
power and the abuse of that power. For that reason they
adopted that clause of the Constitution.
What will be the power resulting from the whole anthracite coal trade, formerly in the hands of three, now in
the hands of one? Who can estimate it? There must be
added also the power which will come from having absorbed both the passenger and the general merchandise
traffic of the two competitors.
In its answer filed, the Reading says that it had recently
greatly increased its business by connections with the Baltimore and Ohio and the New York Central, so that it became necessary that it should acquire the best and greatest
terminal facilities in New York Harbor. This was the
more important because by means of the Lehigh Valley it
would have a line to the Great Lakes, and thus be enabled
to sweep in a vast general trade from the West to the seaboard. This means power, and enormous power.
When the prohibition contained in our Constitution
was adopted in 1874, the most active incentive to its adoption was the Pennsylvania Railroad, which had been riding
rough-shod over the State, controlling legislatures and city
councils. The people had had enough of that master.
They were not willing it should be greater; and they intended to prevent, if possible, the creation of another.
Many of the people of Pennsylvania are for the moment
filled with the generous hope that the Reading leases will
pull through. But if that hope should affect the judgment
of the Court, might we not all live to regret it?
The provision of the Constitution is a wise one, and
recent events in Philadelphia show it to have been wise.
The prohibition of the Constitution against parallel or
competing lines of railroads, leasing or controlling each
other, does not apply to the street railways of a city.' In
consequence, we have in Philadelphia an organization
1 Gyger v. West Phila. P. R. Co., 26 W. N. C., 437.

